The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism

In Sanjit Chakraborty (ed.), Human Minds and Cultures. Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 137-158 (2024)
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Abstract

I defend ethical hedonism, the view that pleasure is the sole good thing, by arguing that it offers the only answer to an argument for moral skepticism. The skeptical problem arises from widespread fundamental moral disagreement, which entails the presence of enough moral error to undermine the reliability of most processes generating moral belief. We know that pleasure is good through the reliable process of phenomenal introspection, which reveals what our experiences are like. If knowing of pleasure’s goodness through phenomenal introspection is the only reliable way to form our initial moral beliefs, we should accept ethical hedonism.

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Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore

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