The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Christine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational to do should be the agent’s dispositional desire strengths, as our normative intuitions respond to these.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SINTHT-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-11-20
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-11-20

Total views
53 ( #42,331 of 51,671 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #22,562 of 51,671 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.