Towards a computational theory of mood

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood I propose places them within the context of other mental phenomena and is consistent with the empirical data on moods

Author's Profile

Laura Sizer
Mount Holyoke College

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
407 (#37,912)

6 months
153 (#17,116)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?