Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest
Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243 (2011)
Abstract
This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
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2011
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2009-11-21
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1,400 ( #3,651 of 71,243 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
116 ( #5,756 of 71,243 )
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