Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest

Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.

Author's Profile

Knut Olav Skarsaune
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-11-21

Downloads
2,683 (#2,408)

6 months
568 (#1,806)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?