Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest

Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243 (2011)
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Abstract
This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
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2011
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2009-11-21

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