Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology

Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§ 9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view.

Author's Profile

Anthony Skelton
University of Western Ontario

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-12-11

Downloads
1,524 (#7,466)

6 months
226 (#12,853)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?