Sidgwick’s Argument for Utilitarianism and his Moral Epistemology: A Reply to David Phillips

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
David Phillips’s Sidgwickian Ethics is a penetrating contribution to the scholarly and philosophical understanding of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. This note focuses on Phillips’s understanding of (aspects of) Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism and the moral epistemology to which he subscribes. In § I, I briefly outline the basic features of the argument that Sidgwick provides for utilitarianism, noting some disagreements with Phillips along the way. In § II, I raise some objections to Phillips’s account of the epistemology underlying the argument. In § III, I reply to the claim that there is a puzzle at the heart of Sidgwick’s epistemology. In § IV, I respond to Phillips’s claim that Sidgwick is unfair in his argument against the (deontological) morality of common sense.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SKEROD
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-07-23

Total views
451 ( #10,292 of 53,536 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #17,523 of 53,536 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.