Sidgwick’s Argument for Utilitarianism and his Moral Epistemology: A Reply to David Phillips

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
David Phillips’s Sidgwickian Ethics is a penetrating contribution to the scholarly and philosophical understanding of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. This note focuses on Phillips’s understanding of (aspects of) Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism and the moral epistemology to which he subscribes. In § I, I briefly outline the basic features of the argument that Sidgwick provides for utilitarianism, noting some disagreements with Phillips along the way. In § II, I raise some objections to Phillips’s account of the epistemology underlying the argument. In § III, I reply to the claim that there is a puzzle at the heart of Sidgwick’s epistemology. In § IV, I respond to Phillips’s claim that Sidgwick is unfair in his argument against the (deontological) morality of common sense.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SKEROD
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-07-23

Total downloads
340 ( #6,820 of 35,943 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #11,228 of 35,943 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.