Against Grounding Necessitarianism
Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751 (2015)
Abstract
Can there be grounding without necessitation? Can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts, even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain but not the former? It is an orthodoxy in recent literature about the nature of grounding, and in first-order philosophical disputes about what grounds what, that the answer is no. I will argue that the correct answer is yes. I present two novel arguments against grounding necessitarianism, and show that grounding contingentism is fully compatible with the various explanatory roles that grounding is widely thought to play
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2014-06-22
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2014-06-22
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1,679 ( #2,665 of 69,112 )
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184 ( #3,001 of 69,112 )
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