Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343 (2017)
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Abstract
There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will motivate a so far neglected, reconciliatory position between privatism and intersubjectivism according to which all thoughts are public while some senses are private.
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First archival date: 2017-10-24
Latest version: 3 (2017-10-24)
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