Blur and interoceptive vision
Philosophical Studies:1-19 (forthcoming)
Abstract
The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision
according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive
content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing
the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related
phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus.
The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal
character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency
thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, the
interoceptive approach is free from controversial assumptions adopted by other
philosophical theories of blurred experiences and is able to account for the epistemic
and motivational role of visual blur, i.e. that blurred experiences provide a
prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivate actions
directed toward our eyes.
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Archival date: 2021-01-12
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2021-01-12
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Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #13,888 of 56,084 )
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