Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology of Time

Metaphysica 22 (2):173-188 (2021)
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Abstract
I argue that Hume’s philosophy of time is relationist in the following two senses. 1) Standard definition of relationism. Time is a succession of indivisible moments. Hence there is no time independent of change. Time is a relational, not substantial feature of the world. 2) Rigid relationism. There is no evidence of uniform natural standard for synchronization of clocks. No absolute temporal metric is available. There are countless times, and no time is privileged. Combining 1) and 2) shows that Hume’s ontology of time is thoroughly relationist.
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Archival date: 2021-03-15
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