Dispositions and the principle of least action revisited

Analysis 75 (3):386-395 (2015)
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Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons espoused by Ellis

Author Profiles

Benjamin Smart
University of Johannesburg
Karim Thebault
University of Bristol


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