Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421 (2016)
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree of irrationality. In section three, I argue that it also solves the puzzle of transparency by explaining why it’s rational to answer the question whether one believes that p by answering the question whether p. Finally, in section four, I defend the simple theory against objections by arguing that self-knowledge constitutes an ideal of rationality.
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Archival date: 2016-04-17
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Without Justification.Sutton, Jonathan
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John

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