Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?

In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 73-94 (2014)
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This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that foundationalism and access internalism form a coherent and well-motivated package
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