DOES KUTZ’S THEORY OF JOINT ACTION ATTRIBUTE RESPONSIBILITY TO SHAREOWNERS?

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Christopher Kutz misapplies his theory of joint action when he attributes shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the corporations in which they invest. Instead I propose that his theory of joint action should be used to attribute shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the stock market. If shareholders’ accountability is grounded in their intentional participation in the stock market, then shareholders cannot take responsibility for corporation’s individual actions. Instead they are solely responsible for the benefits they gain from holding shares if these are a result of moral wrongdoing and for this they should be held accountable.

Author's Profile

M Smith
University of Western Ontario

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2014-06-08

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