Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference

Erkenntnis 80 (3):605-616 (2015)
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The _Principle of Indifference_ was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called _problem of multiple of partitions_. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what underlies the problem of multiple partitions is a fundamental tension between POI and the very idea of _evidential incomparability_
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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