Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300 (2012)
Abstract
This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’
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2020-03-06
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134 ( #33,522 of 56,890 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #10,131 of 56,890 )
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