Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’

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Declan Smithies
Ohio State University

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