The Epistemic Function of Higher-Order Evidence

In Paul Silva & Luis Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Perspectives in Epistemology (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This chapter provides a critical overview of several influential proposals about the epistemic function of higher-order evidence. I start by criticizing accounts of higher-order evidence that appeal to evidential defeat (§1), epistemic conflicts (§2), and unreasonable knowledge (§3). Next, I propose an alternative account that appeals to a combination of improper basing (§4) and non-ideal rationality (§5). Finally, I conclude by summarizing my reasons for preferring this account of higher-order evidence to the alternatives (§6).
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