The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):253-272 (2017)
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Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the opposite is true: if anything, Huemer’s use of the principle of indifference supports the rationality of inductive scepticism

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Robert Smithson
University of North Carolina at Wilmington


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