The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the opposite is true: if anything, Huemer’s use of the principle of indifference supports the rationality of inductive scepticism
Reprint years
2015, 2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
478 ( #10,818 of 57,178 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #10,292 of 57,178 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.