Underdetermination and closure: Thoughts on two sceptical arguments

In Matthew Jope & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge (forthcoming)
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In this paper, I offer reasons for thinking that two prominent sceptical arguments in the literature – the underdetermination-based sceptical argument and the closure-based sceptical argument – are less philosophically interesting than is commonly supposed. The underdetermination-based argument begs the question against a non-sceptic and can be dismissed with little fanfare. The closure-based argument, though perhaps not question-begging per se, does rest upon contentious assumptions that a non-sceptic is under no pressure to accept.

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Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh


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