Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585 (2007)
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Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.

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Donald Smith
Virginia Commonwealth University


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