“… (why Husserl) … (why Husserl is more contemporary than time itself) … (time itself) …”

SITE Magazine (26-27) (2009)
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Abstract
Even though Husserl’s thinking has received a remarkable amount of attention over the last decades, the full extent of many of its central aspects still remains surprisingly unknown. It is in particular the development of genetic phenomenology that is at stake here, as it plunges ever deeper into “originary constitution” ferreting out the structural relations between inner time-consciousness, affectivity and intersubjectivity, while at the same time never giving up static phenomenology and a certain prioritizing of Cartesian subjectivity. In the following I would like to point to a reading of Husserl’s philosophy of time and subjectivity that is based on material that was never examined by Derrida. A general problem for interpreting this theme is that Husserl never succeeded in presenting a systematic overview of a phenomenological “transcendental aesthetics”. As a consequence, the co-originality and mutual interdependence of the constitution of space and time, of originary spacing as flesh (Urleib) and originary temporization (Urzeitigung), which first enables a comprehensive grasp of the originary processes in the living streaming present, has remained virtually unknown. In order to reach these themes, the interaction between the radicalized and the universal reductions has to be outlined.
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