The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life

Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):536-562 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I defend the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account (GCA) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argue that the best theory of the meaning of life should clearly distinguish between subjective fulfillment and objective meaningfulness. The GCA respects the distinction. And it is superior to its leading rivals in the recent literature, most notably those of Erik Wielenberg and Susan Wolf
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMUTGC
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-10-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-10-07

Total views
879 ( #5,144 of 2,433,130 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
155 ( #3,685 of 2,433,130 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.