Structural Injustice and the Emotions

Res Publica 27 (4):577-592 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A structural harm results from countless apparently innocuous interactions between a great many individuals in a social system, and not from any agent’s intentionally producing the harm. Iris Young has influentially articulated a model of individual moral responsibility for such harms, and several other philosophers have taken it as their starting point for dealing with the phenomenon of structural injustice. In this paper, I argue that this social connection model is far less realistic and socially effective than it aims to be. This is because the model systematically neglects the key role played by the emotions in human moral life.

Author's Profile

Nick Smyth
Fordham University

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-02-09

Downloads
386 (#49,626)

6 months
128 (#36,747)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?