Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts

In F. Cariani (ed.), DEON 2014. Springer. pp. 208-223 (2014)
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Abstract

Contrastivism about ‘ought’ holds that ‘ought’ claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets of mutually exclusive but not necessarily jointly exhaustive alternatives. This kind of theory can solve puzzles that face other linguistic theories of ‘ought’, via the rejection or severe restriction of principles that let us make inferences between ‘ought’ claims. By rejecting or restricting these principles, however, the contrastivist takes on a burden of recapturing acceptable inferences that these principles let us make. This paper investigates the extent to which a contrastivist can do this.

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Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews

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