Science, dualities and the phenomenological map

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We present an epistemological scheme of natural sciences inspired in Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the \emph{phenomenological map}, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The scheme has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of sufficient reason are both implied by the scheme, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the scheme has some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative scheme advanced during the first part of the XX century (which we call Popper-Einstein and has its roots in Hertz). Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. We track the problem to hidden hypothesis in Einstein's work. While the main mathematical observation has been known for more than a century it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view, probably because the socially dominating epistemology in physics discourages so doing.
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First archival date: 2021-05-08
Latest version: 2 (2021-05-17)
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