Slouching Towards Dualism [Book Review]

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216):257-263 (2001)
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Abstract
Searle may protest too much his anti-dualism. It may be that what needs reconsideration is not so much the traditional opposition between material and mental as the supposed opposition between property dualism and our contemporary scientific world view. Searle at one points notes that "[w]hen we come to the proposition that reality is physical, we come to what is perhaps the crux of the whole discussion." I agree.
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Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank
Mental Events.Davidson, Donald
Minds, Brains and Science.Stich, Stephen P. & Searle, John

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