How we think and act together

Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):298-314 (2017)
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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
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Archival date: 2016-06-29
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References found in this work BETA
Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel & Gallagher, Shaun
Mind Misreading.Spaulding, Shannon

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2016-06-29

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