Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543 (2019)
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Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non- moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.

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Jacob Sparks
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo


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