Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543 (2019)
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Abstract
Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non- moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.
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Archival date: 2019-04-02
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