An argument against causal decision theory

Analysis 81 (1):52-61 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SPEAAA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-12
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-09-12

Total views
342 ( #19,639 of 64,124 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #9,128 of 64,124 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.