Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?

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Abstract
Seeking a decision theory that can handle both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory, some philosophers recently have turned to ‘graded ratifiability’. The graded ratifiability approach to decision theory is, however, despite its virtues, unsatisfactory; for it conflicts with the platitude that it is always rationally permissible for an agent to knowingly choose their best option.
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Archival date: 2021-07-22
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2021-07-22

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