Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special Composition Question

Erkenntnis 82 (4):857-872 (2017)
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Abstract
Strong Composition as Identity is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence is mistaken. Although I am sympathetic to this objection, in this paper, I present two responses on behalf of the theorist. I also show that once the defender of accepts one of these two responses, that defender will be able to answer The Special Composition Question.
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Archival date: 2018-11-09
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Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Plural Predication.McKay, Thomas

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Composition and Relative Counting.Carrara, Massimiliano & Lando, Giorgio

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