Intrinsically Desiring the Vague

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (forthcoming)
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Abstract

If there are vague propositions, then the question arises whether it is rational to care intrinsically about the vague. This paper argues—contra Bacon (2018), the most comprehensive defence of vague proposition to date—that it is. Some things, such as pain, may be rational to care intrinsically about only if precise, but some things, such as truth, are rational to care intrinsically about even if vague.

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Jack Spencer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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