Abstract
In the Leviathan, Hobbes makes use of the Delphic injunction nosce teipsum (know thyself) as a mark of
the beginning of an investigation about the human passions. In this passage, however, the status of self-knowledge
proposed by the author sounds obscure. It can be a rational knowledge capable of causally explaining human
passions; or it can be an empirical knowledge, pertaining to the deliberation of suitable means for particular ends of
action. I will argue that self-knowledge refers to both ways: self-knowledge is (1) rational and theoretical, concerning
universally valid knowledge about humanity; however, it is also (2) empirical and practical, concerning dispositions
and manners, which are founded on the affective chain of imagination. These two senses of self-knowledge should
together establish a comprehensive moral doctrine, as it encompasses both a theory of the natural condition of
desire and an account of the determination of individual action.