Lê-te a ti mesmo: Imaginação, razão e autoconhecimento em Hobbes

Dois Pontos 20 (3):98-113 (2023)
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Abstract

In the Leviathan, Hobbes makes use of the Delphic injunction nosce teipsum (know thyself) as a mark of the beginning of an investigation about the human passions. In this passage, however, the status of self-knowledge proposed by the author sounds obscure. It can be a rational knowledge capable of causally explaining human passions; or it can be an empirical knowledge, pertaining to the deliberation of suitable means for particular ends of action. I will argue that self-knowledge refers to both ways: self-knowledge is (1) rational and theoretical, concerning universally valid knowledge about humanity; however, it is also (2) empirical and practical, concerning dispositions and manners, which are founded on the affective chain of imagination. These two senses of self-knowledge should together establish a comprehensive moral doctrine, as it encompasses both a theory of the natural condition of desire and an account of the determination of individual action.

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