A Kantian Response to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):33-61 (2012)
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One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s conception of analyticity allows for analytic judgments of a wider range of syntactic forms.

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Nicholas Stang
University of Toronto, St. George


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