Collective Responsibility for Oppression

Social Theory and Practice 43 (3):473-501 (2017)
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Abstract
Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups.
ISBN(s)
0037-802X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STACRF
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Archival date: 2017-08-04
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2017-08-04

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