Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidence possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved by applying the concept of duty to belief indirectly.

Author's Profile

Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University


Added to PP

1,310 (#4,813)

6 months
115 (#8,129)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?