Moral knowledge, epistemic externalism, and intuitionism

Ratio 21 (3):329-343 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might benefit from paying attention to this fact. At the same time, the terrain of moral epistemology (approached as a sub-field of metaethics) needs to be reshaped by the realisation that externalists can steal the thunder of intuitionists when it comes to knowledge constituted by seemingly self-evident beliefs.1.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STAMKE
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
925 ( #5,477 of 64,206 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #10,752 of 64,206 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.