Persons and their properties

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-175 (1998)
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Abstract
According to what I call ‘the asymmetry thesis’, persons, though they are the direct bearers of the properties expressed by mental predicates, are not the direct bearers of properties such as those expressed by ‘weighs 135 pounds’ or ‘has crossed legs’. A number of different views about persons entail the asymmetry thesis. I first argue that the asymmetry thesis entails an error theory about our discourse involving person‐referring terms. I then argue that it is further threatened by consideration of the grounds we have for self‐ascribing mental and physical predicates
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Survival and Identity.Lewis, David K.
Indexicality and Deixis.Nunberg, Geoffrey

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