Abstract
Many distributive egalitarians do not endorse strict equality of goods.
Rather, they treat an equal division as having a special status such that
departures from equality must be justified. They claim, then, that an equal
division is “presumptively” just. Though the idea that equality is
presumptively just and that departures from it may be just has intuitive
appeal, making a case for this idea proves difficult. I argue, first, that extant
“presumption arguments” are unsound. Second, I distill two general
philosophical morals: luck egalitarians have not adequately defended the
presumption of equality and they face serious obstacles in doing so; Rawls
has defended it, but only indirectly via the contract apparatus. This
approach narrows the presumption’s appeal. Third, I consider and reject
two alternative ways of understanding the presumption of equality that
might avoid the problems revealed by my examination of extant views. The
first appeals to the idea of value pluralism. The second treats the
presumption as a view about the burden of proof. I conclude, ultimately,
that it is misleading to think of distributive egalitarianism as typically
having the form of a presumption argument.