Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Dialogue 50 (2):333-346 (2011)
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Abstract
In a recent paper (2008), I presented two arguments against the thesis that intentional states are essentially normative. In this paper, I defend those arguments from two recent responses, one from Nick Zangwill in his (2010), and one from Daniel Laurier in the present volume, and offer improvements of my arguments in light of Laurier’s criticism.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2011-06-15

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