Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality

Dialectica 65 (4):537-559 (2011)
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Abstract
In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. In response to this strategy, I distinguish between two types of intentionality and argue that belief is no less intentional than action is
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Archival date: 2016-01-19
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Intentionality.Searle, John
Intentionality.Searle, John R.
.van Inwagen, Peter

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Freedom and Reason.Schmitt, Margaret

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2011-11-23

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