Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics

Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898 (2018)
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It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Levelling counterfactual scepticism.Sandgren, Alexander & Steele, Katie

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