Abstract

Drug regulation is fraught with inductive risk. Regulators must make a prediction about whether or not an experimental pharmaceutical will be effective and relatively safe when used by typical patients, and such predictions are based on a complex, indeterminate, and incomplete evidential basis. Such inductive risk has important practical consequences. If regulators reject an experimental drug when it in fact has a favourable benefit/harm profile, then a valuable intervention is denied to the public and a company’s material interests are needlessly thwarted. Conversely, if regulators approve an experimental drug when it in fact has an unfavourable benefit/harm profile, then resources are wasted, people are needlessly harmed, and other potentially more effective treatments are underutilized. Given that such regulatory decisions have these practical consequences, non-epistemic values about the relative importance of these consequences impact the way such regulatory decisions are made (similar to the analysis of laboratory studies on the toxic effects of dioxins presented in Douglas [2000]). To balance the competing demands of the pertinent non-epistemic values, regulators must perform what I call an “inductive risk calculus.” At least in the American context this inductive risk calculus is not well-managed.