Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
People tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). This phenomenon is known as the "illusion of asymmetric insight." While the illusion has been well documented by a series of recent experiments, less has been done to explain it. In this paper, we argue that extant explanations are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. The explanation is based on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased way, and the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STEETI-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-03-09
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-03-09

Total views
27 ( #33,224 of 38,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #14,144 of 38,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.