Helen Frowe’s “Practical Account of Self-Defence”: A Critique

Public Reason 5 (1):87-96 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, her attempt to restrict subjectivism primarily to “urgent” situations like self-defense contradicts her own point of departure and is either incoherent or futile. Finally, the only actual whole-heartedly objectivist account she criticizes is an easy target; while those objectivist accounts one finds in certain Western European jurisdictions are immune to her criticisms. Those accounts are also clearly superior to hers in terms of action-guidingness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STEHFP
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-10-23

Total views
349 ( #13,585 of 52,730 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #14,324 of 52,730 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.