Individuality and the control of life cycles

In Scott Lidgard & Lynn K. Nyhart (eds.), Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 84-108 (2017)
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Abstract

I will argue that MLS theory does not provide a complete, self- sufficient approach to theorizing about evolutionary transitions. As a formal, mathematical theory about evolution within a population, it presupposes but does not address the material structure of the population that realizes the model. An MLS model might tell us whether a cooperative trait could be- come fixed in a population, for example, but it won’t be able to explain how the cooperation actually works to produce an adaptive effect on the group’s fitness. It also won’t be able to account for the sources of variety in the pos- sible modes of cooperation available to a population. MLS theory can tell us when fitness has transferred from one level of units to another, but it can give misleading answers unless we have some other, principled guide for picking out units (Clarke 2012; Clarke 2014). Furthermore, it is commonly acknowl- edged among biologists that actually measuring the fitness of an individual— sometimes even obtaining and interpreting proxy measurements—is diffi- cult in practice and prone to error (Hendry 2005; Orr 2009). Hence even if MLS theory were sufficient in principle, there would still be room for other approaches in practice that avoided the difficulties and limitations of depend- ing on fitness alone.

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Beckett Sterner
Arizona State University

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