Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection
Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177 (2020)
Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject φ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept φ or suspend judgment about φ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.
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2019-07-12
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2019-07-12
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239 ( #21,894 of 56,029 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
129 ( #4,263 of 56,029 )
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