PLACE: PRESENCE AS SECOND-PERSONAL SPACE

Journal of Ethical Reflections 1 (4):7-16 (2019)
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Abstract

The concept of place is ultimately a matter of ethical significance—of where something fits in a nexus or structure of meaning. Often this meaning is quite personal, involving a sense of presence we associate with a place. This essay investigates this connection through a study of Wordsworth’s poem, “Tintern Abbey.” It argues that the notion of a presence-infused place is ultimately that of a second-personal space. Presence is a matter of second-personal openness. Therefore, when presence infuses place, it makes its space second-personal also.

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Stephen Darwall
Yale University

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