Peirce, Pedigree, Probability

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166 (2022)
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An aspect of Peirce’s thought that may still be underappreciated is his resistance to what Levi calls _pedigree epistemology_, to the idea that a central focus in epistemology should be the justification of current beliefs. Somewhat more widely appreciated is his rejection of the subjective view of probability. We argue that Peirce’s criticisms of subjectivism, to the extent they grant such a conception of probability is viable at all, revert back to pedigree epistemology. A thoroughgoing rejection of pedigree in the context of probabilistic epistemology, however, _does_ challenge prominent subjectivist responses to the problem of the priors.

Author Profiles

Tom F. Sterkenburg
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Rush T. Stewart
King's College London


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