Sub-intentional actions and the over-mentalization of agency

In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)
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This paper argues, by attention to the category of sub-intentional agency, that many conceptions of the nature of agency are 'over-mentalised', in that they insist that an action proper must be produced by something like an intention or a reason or a desire. Sub-intentional actions provide counterexamples to such conceptions. Instead, it is argued, we should turn to the concept of a two-way power in order to home in on the essential characteristics of actions.
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